Despite several studies such as the Bottom Up Review (BUR), Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and National Defense Panel (NDP), there is no coherent, workable plan for implementing significant defense reform. As a result, America's armed forces are being "salami sliced" to a smaller version of a the cold war force as resources continue to decline. Scarce resources are being spent on expensive weapons systems that no longer have a mission in the new uncertain threat environment of the 21st Century. The Congress has not been effective in implementing significant reform and will not be so in the future. The services are focused on maintaining their share of the defense budget rather than moving toward true reform. The present program is unaffordable and the problems will worsen as systems hit block obsolescence and resources continue to decline. The paper proposes a "BRAC like" commission to review programs and force structure and recommend savings of $10 billion per year to begin funding the transition. The President and Congress would have the option of accepting or rejecting but not modifying the commission's recommendations.
continue to be challenged despite the lack of a monolithic threat as the nation continues remain globally engaged to support its vital interests.
The nature of the threats that the military and the nation will face has also changed. gross national product (GNP) will continue to decline. Defense spending in 1998 was 3.2 percent of the GNP but is projected to be only 2.8 percent of the GNP by
2003. This is the smallest percentage of the GNP dedicated to defense since the 1930s. Pressure to balance the budget, fix social security, and spending for other social programs is likely to increase the pressure to decrease defense spending even further. It is going to be difficult to convince the American public that more of the budget needs to be applied toward defense when the United
States is the world's only superpower and there is not a readily identifiable threat to our way of life.
Base closures and realignments (BRAC) and management efficiencies have also been suggested as possible sources of transition funding for the Department of Defense. While both BRAC and business efficiencies will provide significant sources of funding for DoD, there are problems in both areas and it is doubtful that sufficient funding will be provided. The Government Accounting
Office is skeptical of savings from both areas and has recently issued reports stating "The 1998 FYDP projects billions of dollars in savings due to management initiatives, but DoD does not have details on how all of the savings will be achieved" 12 and "savings from infrastructure reductions have too often not been as large as anticipated and tended to be absorbed by unplanned or underestimated expenses in day to day operations" 13 .
BRAC deserves a closer look because the Department of Defense is relying so heavily on BRAC savings to finance the future. There have been four BRAC rounds, 1988 BRAC rounds, ,1991 BRAC rounds, ,1993 BRAC rounds, ,1995 Service accounting systems are designed to record expenditures rather than reflect savings so it has been difficult to exactly measure infrastructure savings.
The services have been reluctant in some cases to identify savings because they fear that their budgets will be reduced by Congress or the Department of Defense and proceeds from the savings will be applied outside of the service generating the savings. The GAO also noted that the entire process could have been more effective if the services would have cooperated better with each other during the BRAC rounds.
Saving from BRAC and good business practices are significant but there are problems measuring the savings and the amount of these savings is sure to be less than DoD was planning on having available. While the exact amount of the savings is unclear, it is very clear that these savings are not going to be sufficient to fund the current defense program, much less the Department of Defense's transformation to a 21st Century Force. Other funding sources are going to be required for DoD to accomplish any meaningful transformation.
Since additional defense spending is extremely unlikely, the Department of Defense is going to be forced to find another method of funding the transformation.
Representative Curt Weldon, R-PA, House National Security Committee, recently stated that there is little support in Congress or the American public for increased defense spending. 15 Since it is extremely unlikely that additional funds will be added to the defense budget, the services are going to have to fund any transition themselves in a period of declining defense spending combined with the knowledge that projected savings from infrastructure reductions and efficiencies are going to be insufficient. Additional savings are going to have to be generated through some combination of reductions in force structure, The services, the defense industry, and defense workers are very skilled at applying pressure to gain Congressional support to maintain programs and jobs.
Another alternative that has been suggested is to accept some risk and skip a generation of procurement while continuing research and development on promising technologies. Under this plan, the services would upgrade current systems and extend system life with service life extension programs (SLEPS) while experimenting. The Army is presently upgrading systems such as the Apache to the Apache Longbow and the Navy could easily extend service life of some of its ships by replacing the nuclear fuel at much less cost than buying a new ship. This course of action would require monitoring systems being developed and fielded by other nations but in the case of aircraft, there is some logic in deferring procurement of the F22 and F/A-18E/F until there is something flying that can threaten current platforms. New F15Es, F16s or F/A-18C/Ds could be purchased at a significantly reduced price to replace losses or systems that were not mission capable. The same logic can be applied to the Navy submarine and carrier programs. There may be certain areas where a minimum amount of procurement will have to occur to maintain production capability, but these cases are manageable. This strategy would also provide the $6 to $10 billion per year that the NDP estimated would be necessary for transformation.
Another possible solution for beginning to attack the problem might be a "BRAC like" committee appointed by the President with the approval of Congress with the mission of examining service programs and organizations and recommending which should survive and which are relics that are no longer needed. The immediate goal of the committee could be to generate the $6 billion to $10 billion annually that will be required for a transition. Similar to the BRAC recommendations, Congress and the President would have the option of accepting the recommendations in their entirety or rejecting the entire report.
The committee would have to be bi-partisan and contain members with tremendous stature and defense knowledge. One possible source of membership for the committee would be former warfighting CINCs. Accepting the recommendations of a bi-partisan committee might also provide the political cover that members of Congress need to support meaningful defense reform..
The Department of Defense and the entire country are facing problems that will not go away with a "business as usual approach" and will only get worse in the future unless we take action now. One thing that is certain is that the world will continue to be dangerous. The dangers will not be the same as those faced in the past but will be real nonetheless. The Department of Defense and the military services need to significantly change to develop and field organizations and weapons system best suited to combat these new challenges.
The alternative is to keep "muddling through" while the services' capabilities continue to slowly erode. This path leads to a future where the military is not capable of supporting our foreign policy program and the program will have to be adjusted downward to a level that can be supported with diminished military capabilities. Serious change is possible but it would take leadership or a bold new approach. Phil Odeen, Chairman of the National Defense Panel, put it most realistically when he stated that he doesn't see the type of serious leadership in the Pentagon required to affect real change 22 . The Department of Defense is going to change significantly. It is a question of when rather than if the change will occur. What remains to be seen is whether it will require a crisis to force meaningful change or if reforms can be made during this historic window of opportunity.
